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Abstract. Negotiation is an important and pervasive form of social interaction.
The design of autonomous negotiating agents involves the consideration of
insights from multiple relevant research areas to integrate different perspectives
on negotiation. As a starting point for an interdisciplinary research effort, this
paper presents a model that handles bilateral multi-issue negotiation, employs
game-theoretic techniques to define equilibrium strategies for the bargaining
game of alternating offers, and formalizes a set of negotiation strategies and
tactics studied in the social sciences. Autonomous agents equipped with the
model are currently being developed using the Jade framework. The agents
are able to negotiate under both complete and incomplete information, thereby
making the model in particular and the agents in general very compelling for
automated negotiation.
1 Introduction
Autonomous negotiating agents representing individuals or organizations and capable
of reaching mutually beneficial agreements are becoming increasingly important.
Examples, to mention a few, include the business trend toward agent-based supply
chain management, the pivotal role that electronic commerce is increasingly assuming
in organizations, and the industrial trend toward virtual enterprises (see, e.g., [2,4]).
Artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have paid some attention to automated
negotiation over the last years and a number of models have been proposed in the
literature. These models can be classified into three main classes [7]: (i) game-theoretic
models, (ii) heuristic models, and (iii) argumentation-based models. Game-theoretic
models provide clear analysis of specific negotiation situations and precise results
concerning the optimal strategies negotiators should choose, i.e., the strategies that
maximize negotiation outcome (see, e.g., [5,8]). Heuristic models provide general
guidelines to assist negotiators and beneficial strategies for moving toward agreement,
i.e., strategies that lead to good (rather than optimal) outcomes (see, e.g., [3,6]).
Typically, they are based on informal models of interaction and negotiation from
the social sciences. Argumentation-based models allow negotiators to argue about
their mental attitudes during the negotiation process. Thus, in addition to submitting
proposals, negotiators can provide arguments either to justify their negotiation stance
or to persuade other negotiators to change their negotiation stance (see, e.g., [16]).
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Game-theoretic models have some highly desirable properties, such as Pareto
efficiency and the ability to guarantee convergence. However, most models make the
following restrictive assumptions: (i) the agents are rational, (ii) the set of candidate
solutions is fixed and known by all the agents, and (iii) each agent knows either the
other agents’ payoffs for all candidate solutions or the other agents’ potential attitudes
toward risk and expected-utility calculations.
Heuristic models exhibit the following desirable features: (i) they are based on
realistic assumptions, and (ii) they make use of moderate computational resources
to find acceptable solutions (according to the principles of bounded rationality [18]).
However, most models lack a rigorous theoretical underpinning − they are essentially
ad hoc in nature. Also, they often lead to outcomes that are sub-optimal. Finally,
there is often no precise understanding of how and why they behave the way they do.
Consequently, they need extensive evaluation.
Argumentation-based models attempt mainly to marry the exchange of offers
with the exchange of arguments. This permits great flexibility since, for instance,
it makes possible to persuade agents to change their view of an offer during the
course of negotiation. However, most models make considerable demands on any
implementation, mainly because they appeal to very rich representations of the agents
and their environments. Accordingly, some researchers pointed out that agents which
can argue in support of their negotiations will only ever represent a small, though
important, class of automated negotiators [7].
Automated negotiation promises a higher level of process efficiency and a higher
quality of agreements (when compared to traditional, face-to-face negotiation). In
practice, the task of designing and implementing autonomous negotiating agents
involves the consideration of insights from multiple relevant research areas to integrate
different perspectives on negotiation [1]. Yet, most existing models primarily use either
game-theoretic techniques or methods from the social sciences as a basis to develop
negotiating agents, and largely ignore the integration of the results from both areas.
This paper argues that an interdisciplinary approach towards the development of
autonomous negotiating agents is possible and highly desirable − game-theoretic
(strategic) and behavioural negotiation theories can mutually reinforce each other
and lead to more comprehensive and richer models. As a starting point for this
research effort, this paper presents a model for autonomous agents that handles bilateral
multi-issue negotiation, introduces equilibrium strategies for the bargaining game of
alternating offers, and formalizes a set of strategies and tactics frequently used by
human negotiators. On the one hand, it considers two fully informed agents about
the various aspects of the bargaining game and employs game-theoretic techniques to
define equilibrium strategies. On the other hand, it considers two incompletely informed
agents about the various aspects of the game and formalizes a set of negotiation
strategies and tactics studied in the social sciences.
This paper builds on our previous work in the area of negotiation [10,11,12]. In
particular, it extends our negotiation model by introducing a number of negotiation
strategies and tactics motivated by human procedures typical of multi-issue negotiation.
It also lays the foundation for performing an experiment to investigate the performance
of agents equipped with the model in terms of quality and cost of bargaining.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
negotiation model. In particular, subsection 2.1 describes the negotiation protocol and
the preferences of the negotiators, subsection 2.2 introduces equilibrium strategies
for the bilateral multi-issue bargaining game of alternating offers, and subsection 2.3
formalizes concession and problem solving strategies frequently used by human
negotiators. Section 3 discusses related work and section 4 presents concluding
remarks.
2 The Negotiation Model
Negotiation is usually understood as proceeding through three phases [9]: a beginning
or initiation phase, a middle or problem-solving phase, and an ending or resolution
phase. The initiation phase focuses on preparation and planning for negotiation and is
marked by each party’s efforts to posture for positions. The problem-solving phase
seeks a solution for the dispute and is characterized by movement toward a final
agreement. The resolution phase focuses on implementing the final agreement.
Effective preparation and planning involves the creation of a well-laid plan
specifying the activities that negotiators should attend to before starting to negotiate
[17,19]. That plan, and the confidence derived from it, is often a critical factor for
achieving negotiation objectives. Accordingly, we describe below various activities that
negotiators make efforts to perform in order to carefully prepare and plan for negotiation
(see our earlier work for an in-depth discussion [10]).
Let Ag={ag1, ag2} be the set of autonomous negotiating agents. Let
Agenda={is1, . . . , isn} be the negotiating agenda − the set of (independent) issues at
stake. The issues are quantitative variables, defined over continuous intervals. Effective
planning requires that negotiators prioritize the issues, define the limits, and specify
the targets. Priorities are set by rank-ordering the issues, i.e., by defining the most
important, the second most important, and so on. The priority pril of an agent agi ∈Ag
for each issue isl ∈Agenda is a number that represents its order of preference. The
weight wil of isl is a number that represents its relative importance. The limit limil
is the point where agi decides that it should stop to negotiate, because any settlement
beyond this point is not minimally acceptable. The level of aspiration or target point
trgil is the point where agi realistically expects to achieve a settlement.
Additionally, effective planning requires that negotiators agree on an appropriate
protocol that defines the rules governing the interaction. The protocol can be simple,
allowing agents to exchange only proposals. Alternatively, the protocol can be
sophisticated, allowing agents to provide arguments to support their negotiation stance.
As noted earlier, most sophisticated protocols make considerable demands on any
implementation. Thus, in this work we consider a simple protocol (see subsection 2.1).
Finally, effective planning requires that negotiators be able to select appropriate
strategies that account for their individual actions. Traditionally, AI researchers have
paid little attention to this pre-negotiation step. In the last several years, however,
a number of researchers have developed models that include libraries of negotiation
strategies (see, e.g., [6,7,8]). Some strategies are in equilibrium, meaning that no
designer will benefit by building agents that use any other strategies when it is
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known that some agents are using equilibrium strategies (see, e.g., [14] for an
in-depth description of the standard game-theoretic concept of equilibrium). Thus,
for some situations of complete information, the agents can be designed to adopt
equilibrium strategies (see subsection 2.2). However, for situations of incomplete
information, the problem of strategic choice is rather complex. In these situations,
many bargaining models have different equilibria sustained by different assumptions
on what an individual in the game would believe if its opponent took an action that
it was not supposed to take in equilibrium. Hence, our study differs from this line of
work − we address the challenge of building agents that are able to negotiate under
incomplete information by formalizing relevant strategies used by human negotiators
and empirically evaluating the effectiveness of these strategies in different situations
(see subsection 2.3 and the comments on future work in section 4).
2.1 The Negotiation Protocol and Time Preferences
The negotiation protocol is an alternating offers protocol [14]. Two agents or players
bargain over the division of the surplus of n≥2 issues (goods or pies). The players
determine an allocation of the issues by alternately proposing offers at times in
T = {1, 2, . . .}. This means that one offer is made per time period t∈T , with an agent,
say agi, offering in odd periods {1, 3, . . .}, and the other agent agj offering in even
periods {2, 4, . . .}. The negotiation procedure, labelled the “joint-offer procedure”,
involves bargaining over the allocation of the entire endowment stream at once. An
offer is a vector (x1, . . . , xn) specifying a division of the n goods. Once an agreement
is reached, the agreed-upon allocations of the goods are implemented. This procedure
permits agents to exploit the benefits of trading concessions on different issues.
The players’ preferences are modelled by assuming that each player agi discounts
future payoffs at some given rate δti , 0<δti <1, (δti is referred to as the discount factor
and the preferences as time preferences with a constant discount rate). The cost of
bargaining derives from the delay in consumption implied by a rejection of an offer.
Practically speaking, the justification for this form of preferences takes into account
the fact that money today can be used to make money tomorrow. Let Ui be the payoff
function of agi. For simplicity and tractability, we assume that Ui is separable in all
their arguments and that the per-period delay costs are the same for all issues:
Ui(x1, . . . , xn, t) = δ
(t−1)
i
∑n
l=1 wil uil(xl)
where wil is the weight of isil and xl denotes the share of agi for isil. The component
payoff function uil for isil is a continuous, strictly monotonic, and linear function. The
distinguish feature of time preferences with a constant discount rate is the linearity of
the function uil [14]. The payoff of disagreement is normalized at 0 for both players.
2.2 Equilibrium Strategies
The negotiation process is modelled as an extensive game. For theoretical convenience,
we consider the standard game-theoretic situation of two players completely informed
about the various aspects of the game. The players are assumed to be rational, and each
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player knows that the other acts rationally. Also, we consider settings in which there is
more than one issue and the players have different evaluations of the issues.
First, consider a two-sided four-issue bargaining situation. Two players are jointly
endowed with a single unit of each of four goods, {X1, . . . , X4}, and alternate
proposals until they find an agreement. Each good is modelled as an interval [0, 1] (or
as a divisible pie of size 1). The players’ preferences are as follows:
Ui = δ
(t−1)
i (a x1 + b x2 + x3 + x4)
Uj = δ
(t−1)
j [(1 − x1) + (1 − x2) + c (1 − x3) + d (1 − x4)]
where xl and (1 − xl), l=1, . . . , 4, denote the shares of agi and agj for each pie,
respectively. The parameters a, b, c, and d allow the marginal utilities of the players to
differ across issues and players. We consider a > b>1 and d>c>1, i.e., agi places
greater emphasis on goods X1 and X2 while agj values goods X3 and X4 more. Also,
we consider that δi and δj are close to 1 and the parameters a, b, c, and d are close to
one another. Let pt−1j→i and pti→j denote the offers that agj proposes to agi in period t−1
and agi proposes to agj in period t, respectively. Consider the following strategies:
str∗i =
{
offer (1, 1, x∗i3, 0) if agi’s turn
if Ui(pt−1j→i) ≥ U∗i accept else reject if agj’s turn
str∗j =
{
offer (1, x∗j2, 0, 0) if agj’s turn
if Uj(pti→j) ≥ U∗j accept else reject if agi’s turn
where U∗i =Ui(1, x∗j2, 0, 0), U∗j =Uj(1, 1, x∗i3, 0), and the shares
are the following: x∗i3 =
δiδj(a+b)−δj(a+b+bc+bd)+bc+bd
bc−δiδj and
x∗j2 =
δi(δiδj(a+b)−δj(a+b+bc+bd)+bc+bd)+(bc−δiδj)(aδi+bδi−a)
b(bc−δiδj) .
Remark 1. For the two-sided four-issue bargaining game of alternating offers with an
infinite horizon, in which the players’ preferences are as described above, the pair of
strategies (str∗i , str∗j ) form an equilibrium. The outcome is the following:
x∗1 = 1, x
∗
2 = 1, x
∗
3 =
δiδj(a + b) − δj(a + b + bc + bd) + bc + bd
bc − δiδj , x
∗
4 = 0
Agreement is immediately reached with no delay. The outcome is Pareto optimal.
Letting δi →1 and δj →1, the equilibrium division is (1, 1, 0, 0).
Now, consider a two-sided n-issue bargaining situation. Two players bargain over n
distinct goods, {X1, . . . , Xn}, and are allowed to alternate proposals until they find
an agreement. Their preferences are as defined in subsection 2.1. Again, each good is
modelled as a divisible pie of size 1. The players set different weights for the goods
such that: wi1/wj1 > wi2/wj2 > . . . > win/wjn.
Remark 2. The bilateral multi-issue bargaining game of alternating offers with an
infinite horizon, in which the players’ preferences are as described above, has an
equilibrium. The outcome is Pareto optimal:
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
k−1, x
∗
k, x
∗
k+1, . . . , x
∗
n) = (1, . . . , 1, s, 0, . . . , 0)
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where x∗l , l=1, . . . , n, denotes the share of agi for each divisible pie. The constant s
represents the share of agi for the Xk pie.
The proofs of Remark 1 and Remark 2 are based on the familiar necessary
conditions for equilibrium: agi is indifferent between waiting one period to have its
offer accepted and accepting agj’s offer immediately, and agj is indifferent between
waiting one period to have its offer accepted and accepting agi’s offer immediately.
For instance, consider the n-issue bargaining situation. Let x∗i = (x∗i1, . . . , x∗in) and
x∗j =(x
∗
j1, . . . , x
∗
jn) be the equilibrium proposals of agi and agj , respectively. The
problem for agi is stated as follows:
maximize: Ui(x1, . . . , xn, t) = δ(t−1)i
∑n
l=1 wil xl
subject to: Uj(x∗i1, . . . , x∗in, t) = Uj(x∗j1, . . . , x∗jn, t+1)
0 ≤ x∗il ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x∗jl ≤ 1, for l=1, . . . , n
This maximization problem is similar to the continuous (or fractional) knapsack
problem and solvable by a greedy approach [13]. First, agi gives away the maximum
possible share of the issue with the lowest ratio of weights. If the supply of that issue is
exhausted, it gives away the maximum possible share of the issue with the next lowest
ratio of weights, and so forth until agj gets the utility of Uj(x∗j1, . . . , x∗jn, t+1). The
problem for agj is stated in a similar way and also solvable by a greedy approach.
2.3 Concession and Problem Solving Strategies
Game theory can provide sound design principles for computer scientists. The
last subsection has considered two fully informed agents and used game-theoretic
techniques to define equilibrium strategies. The agents were creative, honest, and able
to settle for the outcome that maximizes their benefit (resources were not wasted and
money was not squandered). Yet, the assumption of complete information is of limited
use to the designers of agents. In practice, agents have private information. Also,
simple casual observation reveals the existence of concessions and long periods of
disagreement in many actual negotiations. Furthermore, one agent, say agi, may wish
to act rationally, but the other agent may not behave as a strategically sophisticated,
utility maximizer − thus rendering conventional equilibrium analysis inapplicable.
Behavioral negotiation theory can provide rules-of-thumb to agent designers. The
danger is that the designers may not be fully aware of the circumstances to which
human practice is adapted, and hence use rules that can be badly exploited by
new agents. Nevertheless, an increasing number of researchers consider that human
practice is crucial to automated negotiation (see, e.g., [1]). There is a need to integrate
the procedures and results from behavioral negotiation theory in bargaining models
incorporating game-theoretic techniques. Accordingly, this subsection considers two
incompletely informed agents about the various aspects of the bargaining game and
formalizes relevant strategies studied in the social sciences.
Negotiation strategies can reflect a variety of behaviours and lead to strikingly
different outcomes. However, the following two fundamental groups of strategies are
commonly discussed in the behavioral negotiation literature [15,19]:
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1. concession making − negotiators who employ strategies in this group reduce their
aspirations to accommodate the opponent;
2. problem solving − negotiators maintain their aspirations and try to find ways of
reconciling them with the aspirations of the opponent.
Although it is important to distinguish among these two groups of strategies, we
hasten to add several explanatory notes. First, most strategies are implemented through
a variety of tactics. The line between strategies and tactics often seems indistinct, but
one major difference is that of scope. Tactics are short-term moves designed to enact
or pursue broad (high-level) strategies [9]. Second, concession making strategies are
essentially unilateral strategies − the decision to concede is fundamentally a unilateral
one. By contrast, problem solving strategies are essentially social strategies. Third,
most negotiation situations call forth a combination of strategies from different groups.
Finally, most strategies are only informally discussed in the behavioral literature. They
are not formalized, as typically happens in the game-theoretic literature.
Concession making behaviour aims at partially or totally accommodating the other
party. Consider two incompletely informed agents bargaining over n distinct issues
{is1, . . . , isn}. For convenience, each issue isl is modelled as an interval [minl,maxl].
The agents’ preferences are as defined in subsection 2.1. The opening stance and the
pattern of concessions are two central elements of negotiation. Three different opening
positions (extreme, reasonable and modest) and three levels of concession magnitude
(large, moderate and small) are commonly discussed in the behavioral literature [9].
They can lead to a number of concession strategies, notably:
1. starting high and conceding slowly − negotiators adopt an optimistic opening
attitude and make successive small concessions;
2. starting reasonable and conceding moderately − negotiators adopt a realistic
opening attitude and make successive moderate concessions.
Let pt−1j→i be the offer that agj has proposed to agi in period t−1. Likewise, let pti→j be
the offer that agi is ready to propose in the next time period t. The formal definition of
a generic concession strategy follows.
Definition 1. Let agi ∈Ag be a negotiating agent. A concession strategy for agi is a
function that specifies either the tactic to apply at the beginning of negotiation or the
tactic that defines the concessions to be made during the course of negotiation:
conc
def
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
apply tact1i if agi’s turn and t=1
apply tactti if agi’s turn and t>1
if Ui(pt−1j→i)≥Ui(pti→j) accept else reject if agj’s turn
where tact1i is an opening negotiation tactic and tactti is a concession tactic.
The two aforementioned concession strategies are defined by considering different
tactics. For instance, the “starting reasonable and conceding moderately” strategy is
defined by: “tact1i=starting realistic” and “tactti = moderate” (but see below).
Problem solving behaviour aims at finding agreements that appeal to all sides, both
individually and collectively. The host of problem solving strategies includes [15]:
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1. low-priority concession making − negotiators hold firm on more important issues
while conceding on less important issues;
2. logrolling − negotiators agree to trade-off among the issues under consideration so
that each party concedes on issues that are of low priority to itself and high priority
to the other party.
Low-priority concession making involves primarily the analysis of one’s priorities
and further concessions on less important issues. However, effective logrolling requires
information about the two parties’ priorities so that concessions can be matched up.
This information is not always easy to get. The main reason for this is that negotiators
often try to conceal their priorities for fear that they will be forced to concede on issues
of lesser importance to themselves without receiving any repayment [15]. Despite this,
research evidence indicates that it is often not detrimental for negotiators to disclose
information that can reveal their priorities − a simple rank order of the issues does not
put negotiators at a strategic disadvantage [19]. Hence, we consider that negotiators
willingly disclose information that can help to identify their priorities (e.g., their
interests).
Logrolling can be viewed as a variant of low-priority concession making in which
the parties’ priorities are in the opposite direction. The formal definition of a generic
logrolling strategy follows (the definition of a low-priority concession making strategy
is essentially identical, and is omitted).
Definition 2. Let agi ∈Ag be a negotiating agent and agj ∈Ag be its opponent. Let
Agenda denote the negotiating agenda, Agenda⊕ the subset of the agenda containing
the issues of high priority for agi (and low priority for agj), and Agenda the subset
of the agenda containing the issues of low priority for agi (and high priority for agj).
A logrolling strategy for agi is a function that specifies either the tactic to apply at
the beginning of negotiation or the tactics to make trade-offs during the course of
negotiation:
log
def
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
apply tact1i if agi’s turn and t=1
apply tactt⊕i and tactt

i if agi’s turn and t>1
if Ui(pt−1j→i)≥Ui(pti→j) accept else reject if agj’s turn
where tact1i is an opening negotiation tactic, tactt
⊕
i is a concession tactic (to apply to
the issues on Agenda⊕), and tactti is another concession tactic (to apply to the issues
on Agenda). ”
A number of logrolling strategies can be defined simply by considering different tactics.
For instance, a strategy that specifies a realistic opening attitude, followed by null
concessions on issues on Agenda⊕, and large concessions on issues on Agenda, is
defined by: “tact1i=starting realistic”, “tactt
⊕
i = stalemate”, and “tactt

i = soft”
(but see below).
Opening negotiation tactics are functions that specify the initial values for each issue
isl at stake. The following three tactics are commonly discussed in the behavioral
literature [9]:
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1. starting optimistic−specifies a value far from the target point;
2. starting realistic−specifies a value close to the target point;
3. starting pessimistic − specifies a value close to the limit.
The definition of the tactic “starting realistic” follows (the definition of the other two
tactics is essentially identical, and is omitted).
Definition 3. Let agi ∈Ag be a negotiating agent and isl ∈Agenda a negotiation issue.
Let trgil be the target point of agi for isl. The tactic starting realistic for agi is a function
that takes isl and trgil as input and returns the initial value v[isl]1i of isl:
starting realistic(isl, trgil) = v[isl]1i
where v[isl]1i ∈ [trgil −, trgil +] and >0 is small. ”
Concession tactics are functions that compute new values for each issue isl. The
following five tactics are commonly discussed in the literature [9]:
1. stalemate − models a null concession on isl;
2. tough − models a small concession on isl;
3. moderate − models a moderate concession on isl;
4. soft − models a large concession on isl;
5. accommodate − models a complete concession on isl.
The definition of a generic concession tactic follows (without loss of generality, we
consider that agi wants to maximize isl).
Definition 4. Let agi ∈Ag be a negotiating agent, isl ∈Agenda a negotiation issue,
and limil the limit of isl. Let v[isl]ti be the value of isl offered by agi at period t. A
concession tactic for agi is a function that takes v[isl]ti, limil and the concession factor
Cf∈ [0, 1] as input and returns the new value v[isl]t+2i of isl:
concession tactic(v[isl]ti, limil,Cf ) = v[isl]
t+2
i
where v[isl]t+2i = v[isl]ti − Cf (v[isl]ti−limil). ”
The five tactics are defined by considering different values for Cf . In particular, the
stalemate tactic by Cf =0, the accommodate tactic by Cf =1, and the other three tactics
by different ranges of values for Cf (e.g., the tough tactic by Cf ∈ ]0.00, 0.05], the
moderate tactic by Cf ∈ ]0.05, 0.10], and the soft tactic by Cf ∈ ]0.10, 0.15]).
3 Related Work
AI researchers have investigated the design of autonomous negotiating agents from two
main perspectives: a theoretical or formal perspective and a practical or computational
perspective. Researchers following the theoretical perspective attempt mainly to
develop formal models for describing, specifying, and reasoning about the key features
of the agents. Most researchers have focused on formal bargaining, auctions, market-
oriented programming, contracting, and coalition formation (see, e.g., [5,8]). On the
other hand, researchers following the practical perspective attempt mainly to develop
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computational models for specifying the key data structures of the agents and the
processes operating on these structures. Most models are based on informal procedures
from the social sciences (see, e.g., [3,6,10]).
The task of designing and implementing negotiating agents involves the
consideration of insights from multiple relevant research areas to integrate different
perspectives on negotiation. In particular, game-theoretic (strategic) and behavioural
negotiation theories can mutually reinforce each other and lead to more comprehensive
and richer models. Yet, the majority of existing models largely ignore the integration
of the results from both research areas. Noting this gap, this paper uses both
game-theoretic techniques and methods from the social sciences as a basis to develop
negotiating agents.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that an interdisciplinary approach towards the development of
autonomous negotiating agents is possible and highly desirable. As a starting point for
this research effort, we present a model that handles bilateral multi-issue negotiation,
employs game-theoretic techniques to define equilibrium strategies for the bargaining
game of alternating offers, and formalizes a set of negotiation strategies studied in
the social sciences. Autonomous agents equipped with the model are currently being
developed using the Jade framework. The agents are able to negotiate under both
complete and incomplete information, thereby making the model in particular and the
agents in general very compelling for automated negotiation.
Our aim for the future is to extend the model and to perform its experimental
validation. In particular, the model defines a number of strategies based on
rules-of-thumb distilled from behavioral negotiation theory. Hence, these strategies
need to be empirically evaluated to determine precisely how they behave in different
situations. In addition, we intend to study the bargaining game of alternating offers in
order to define equilibrium strategies for two incompletely informed players.
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